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Project 672-40.I.  INTRODUCTION
The  distinguishing  feature of  Voluntary  Export  Restraints  (VERs)
is that  they  are  administered  by  exporting countries. So long  as the  VER
is  binding,  exports  of the  product under  the  VER,  earn  a scarcity  premium
and  much  work  has  been  dons  to  estimate  the  cost  to importing  countries  --
and  hence  the  gain  to exporting countries --  from  this  transfer.l/  There
are,  however,  other  effects  in  exporting countries  arising  from  a  binding
VER.  These  effects  stem  from the  contractionary  pressure  on the  industry
subjected  to the  VER  and  hence  against factors  employed  in it.  By forcing
factors  out  of  industries in which  they are  most  productive,  VERs  can
impose significant  efficiency losses on  exporters.  Curiously,  these
losses,  which  must  be balanced  against the  rent  transfer  from  abroad.  have
been  neglected  in  the  literature.  The  purpose  of this  paper  is to  explore
these  effects  systematically.
We study  the  negative effects of  VERs  on exporters  from  three
perspectives.  First,  we develop a  fairly  general  theoretical  model  of  an
industry  sub3ect  to the  VER (section  2).  The  industry  sells  its  output  to
two  markets,  one  restricted  and  one  unrestricted.  We examine  the  effects
of a VER  in  the  restricted  market on  sales  in  the  unrestricted  market
(spillover  effect),  on industry  size and  profits,  on national  uelfare,  and
on the  returns  to factors  in  that  industry. The  analysis  suggests  that  the
effects  of a  VER depend  crucially  on  a few  product  supply  and  factor  demand
elasticities.  This  leads  us,  in  section 3, to  carry  out  an illustrative
exercise  to  estimate these key  elasticities  for  the  case  of leather
footwear exports from Taiwan which were  subject to  the USA  Orderly
Harketing  Agreement  tOHA) during 1977-81.  Although not  as precise  as2
desirable  because  of data  limitations,  these  econometric  estimates  suggest
that  the  demand  and  supply  of  footwear  are  quite  elastic;  they  lend  strong
support  to the  qualitative  prediction that the  OMA  induced  some  splllover
to  unrestricted  markets  and  some  contraction  of the  industry  with attendant
efficiency  losses. Finally,  in  section 4,  we combine  the  results  of the
previous  two  sections  into a  simple simulatlon  model  which  analyzes  the
lLkely  effects  of a  VER  on  national  welfare  and  lncome  dlstribution,  taking
into account efficiency losses.  For  plausible elasticity  values  we
establish  that  a typical  VER  will  lead  to  a  worsening  income  distribution,
as profits  in  the  affected  industry rise  and  the  returns  to  other  factors
--  notably  labour  --  fall. Although not formally  part  of our  model,  it  is
clear  that  factor  returns  will tend to  fall  most for  immobile  factors  and
especially  for  labour  whose  skills  are speclflc  to  the  restrLcted  lndustry.
We also  establish  that  exporting countries are  likely  to incur  an  overall
welfare  loss  in spite of  the  rent transfer gain  even  when the  industry
under  the  VER is  of non-negllglble  size.
The  results  of this  paper  are  a  strong  indLctment  of  VERs.  To be
sure,  VERs  are  less harmful to  exporting countrles  than  are  equivalent-
sized  import  quotas  administered  by the  importing  country,  but  nonetheless,
they  can  impose  notable welfare losses wherever  they  restrict  industries
accounting  for  significant  shares of  the  exporters'  economic  activity  or
when they  make  use  of  particular  and  relatively  immobile  skills  or  physlcal
capital. This  suggests that  the  complacency  with whlch  the  economics
profession has  treated the  exporters'  consequences  of  VERs has  been
misplaced.3
II.  A SIMPLE  MODEL
We  consider  the  simplest  possible  model  of  a  VER. For  convenience
we  term  the  restricted  industry  footwear,  but the  results  generalize  to
virtual  any  competitive  industry.  We assume  that  firms  in  an  exporting
country  produce  footwear  for  two  markets,  A  and  B,  using  a  single  composite
variable  factor  of  production,  Z.  For generality  we  assume  that  the  two
types  of  footwear  may differ  and allow for the possibility  that  the
marginal  costs  of  one  may  depend  on the  output  of  the  other.  One  possible
justification  for  this  is the existence  of a  second  implicit  factor  of
production  which is  fixed  in  supply  - e.g. entrepreneurship  or
infrastructure.  We  write the variable  factor  requirements  for  producing
the  outputs  destined  for  the  two  markets,  XA  and  XB,  as
(1)  Z  - G(XA,XB)
where  Z  is  the  quantity  of  the  composite  factor  used,
GA,  GB  > 0,  where  Gi  - Sz  and Oxi
G is  homothetic  but  homogeneous  of  degree  r  <  1.
We  consider  the consequences  of imposing  a  VER or  exports  to
market  A;  those  to  market  B  are assumed  to  be  always  unrestricted.  Firms
are  assumed  to  be  simple  profit-maximizers  and  the  entire  output  is
exported.  2/4
Industry  Profits
Total  profits  from  footwear  in  this  simple  model  are
(2)  f  - PAXA  + PBXB  - WZ
where  Pi are  the  prices  received  from  market  i, i - A,B
Xi the  quantities  supplied,  and
V the  Ivage'  of  the  composite  factor.
Taking  the  total differential  of  (2), substituting  for  dXg  from  the
differential  of (1)
(3)  dZ  GAdXA  +  GBdXB-
If  we use  ni  for  the  inverse of the  mark-up  of  price  over  marginal  revenue
in  market  I, i.e.
(4)  vi'1  +  ei  - A,B,Z 
where  ei is  the  elasticity  of  demand, ei  <  0,  i  - A, B and  eZ is the
elasticity  of supply  of the  composite  factor,  ez  >  0,  we simply  obtain
'IAPA 9B3B 1  BPA (5)  dw - AG  _A  B  v  dZ
A'  ds D  XA  +  GB 
(5')  dw  = dXA.-  NdZ5
Equation  (5)  shows  that  tne  effect on  pLofits of a shock  to the  footwear
industry may  be  decomposed into a  par  relating to  changes in the
allocation  of sales  between  markets (MeXA) ard  a  part relating  to changes
in the  overall  size  of  the  industry (NdZ).  Moreover,  the  parts  bear  a
perfectly  simple  interpretation. 7APA is the  marginal  revenue  from  market
A  and  GA the  marginal  input requirement  for  producing  for  market  A:  thus
the  bracketed component of  M  reflects the marginal return  to factors
*  s  to  XA less that of  those devoted to  XB.  GAdXA  is  the  factor
requirement  for  a  marginal  change in  XA.  If  market  A  generates  greater
marginal  returns  to the  factor than does market B, an increase  in  XA is
desirable. The  term N  compares the marginal  returns  to employing  extra
factors  producing  XB  with  their marginal cost.  The  latter  is the  wage
marked  up by a term  reflecting  any  tendency  for  the  wage to  have to rise  as
employment increases.  If  marginal revenue exceeds marginal costs,
additional  factor  use,  i.e.  additional  output,  would  be desirable.
Firms'  Behavior
We assume that the  footwear industry comprises  many identical
representative  firms, each  of which  maximizes profits subject to the
production  relation  (1). Using  to denote  firms'  outputs  and  inputs,  the
firms'  maximization  problem  is
(6)  max  L - PAXA  + PBXB  - WZ +  X  [Z  - G(XA,XB)J
Homotheticity  implies  that  we may  use  the  same  derivatives  of G( )  for  both
firm  and industry  since  both face  the  same  prices.6
The  first  order  conditions  for  (6)  depend  on  whether  the  firm  is  a
price-taker  or  not. If  it  takes  both  prices  and  wages  as  given  it  solves
(7a)  PA - XGA  m °
(7b)  PB - XGB  3  °
(7c)  W - X  -
(7d)  Z  - G(  )  - O
whkreas  if it recognizes  its power in both markets,  the  first  order
conditions  become
(8a)  VANA  - r'GA  - 0
(8b)  JBPB  - )'G 1 - 0
(Sc)  yZU  -o
(8d)  Z  -G  )  -o 
If  it  has market  power only in certain  markets  it mixes  (7)  and  (8)
appropriately.
It  is  simple  to  show  that if the firn  has  and  exploits  the  same
market  power  as  exists  for the footwear  industry  as  a  whole,  then  M-N-O.
For  example,  a  monopolist  with power to  discriminate  between  markets  and
with  monopsony  power  in  factor  markets  maximizes  industry  profits  as  well
as  his  own. Conditions  (8a)  and  (8b)  equate  the  ViPi/Gi  and  thus  make  M-0.
while  conditions  (8b)  and (8c) give VBPB/ 0 GB  zW  and  thus  make  N-O.
Similarly  if  the  industry  and all the firms  are  genuine  price-  and  wage-
takers,  so  that  leil  - "  all  i,  vi  - 1  and  (7)  ensures  that  M-N-O.  In  both
cases  small  changes  in  XA  and  Z  have  no  effect  on  profits  because  they  have7
already  been maximized  with respect  to these variables.  Non-marginal
changes  will  reduce  the monopolist'ulmonopsonist's  profits,  but  will  have
no  effect  on  profits  in  the competitive  case, This  is  because  wi-th  fixed
prices  and  wages, output  for each market is expanded  until  price  just
equals  marginal  cost  which,  because  of competition,  equals  average  cost.
It  is  only  the  implicit  fixed factor,  which  gives  G(  )  decreasing  returns
to  scale,  that  makes  the  equilibrium  determinate  in  this  case.
If,  on  the  other  hand, individual  firms  do  not  (cannot)  exploit
the  industry's  monopoly  or monopsony  power,  profits  are  not  maximized  at
the  market  equilibrium,  and the posibility arises  that  policy-induced
changes  in  XA  and  Z  may  be beneficial.  This  is  essentially  a situation  in
which  the  optimum  tariff  or  export  tax  is  non-zero.  Substituting  (7)  into
(5)  yields
M  T  1  [  ]w  and  N  - [  .l]W
I'eA  EB  CB  CZe
The  term  N  is  negative,  so a  contraction  in  the  industry,  dZ<O,
would  always  be  desirable  ceteris  paribus.  The sign  of  M is  not  fixed  d
priori,  but  if  A were  the less elastic  market,  lteAl  < leBI,  a  contraction
in  sales  to  A  would  also  be  desirable  ceteris  paribus.  That  is,  fizing  the
size  of  the  industry,  dZ-0, an enforced  switch  out  of  the  less  elastic
market  would  be  desirable.  All of these  effects  arise  because  atomistic
firms  cannot  exploit  national  or  industry  market  power.
It  is  clear  that  price/wage  taking  and  market  power  behavior  may
be  mixed.  Thus  a small  industry  with  the  power  to  sell  as  a  discriminating
monopolist  will  use  f.o.c.s  (8a),  (8b),  and  (7c).  This  will  render  M-0  but8
N  - -ejlW  <  0.  Conversely  an industry  that  was  small  on  world  markets  but
had  monopsony  power  at  home  - not  an  impossible  situation  for  a developing
country  export.  sector  - would behave  according  to  (7a),  (7b),  and  (8C
This  would  leave  H  as  above  and  set  N  - eglW.
ImDosinx  the  VER
We  now consider  imposing  a  VER  in  market  A.  We model it  as  a
small  reduction  in  XA,  dXA  <  0, starting  from  a  position  of equilibrium.
The effect  on profit  is  -t"en  by  (5) with  M  and  N  evaluated  using  an
appropriate  mix  of  (7)  and  (8)  as  above.  It  remains,  however,  to  calculate
late  dZ,  the  effect  of  the  VER  on  total  activity,  as  the industry  moves  to
its  new  equilibrium.  At  the  new equilibrium  firms  will  have XA  imposed
upon  them,  XA  - XA  +  dIA,  where  XA  is  the  initial  equilibrium  point,  but
they  will still  maximize  profits  will respect  to the other  decision
variables  XB  and  Z. Because  there  is  no  optimization  relative  to  XA,  there
is  no  first  order  condition  to determine  it.  The  remaining  first  order
conditions,  however,  will  be unchanged from 7(b) - 7(d)  or 8(b)  - 8(d),
because  the  VER has no  direct  effect  on  equilibration  in the  B  or  Z
markets.  Thus  we  may  calculate  the  effects  of  the  VER in  market  A in  the
standard  comparative  statics  fashion,  by differentiating  the effective
first  order  conditions  and  imposing  aXA  exogenc  iy.
The  most  interesting  case is the competitive  one  in  which  firms
are  price-  and  wage-takers.  Differentiating  (7b)  to  7(d)  gives
(9a)  dPB - GBdX  - XdGB  - 0
(9b)  dW  -dX  -
(9c)  dZ- GAdXA  - GBdXB  *  O9
Using  the  relationship  dGB  - GBAdXA  +  GBBdXB and  substituting  for  dPB  and
dW along  the  actual demand  and  supply  schedules,  these  may  be  manipulated
to obtain
dXB  Zf2  BA
(10)  2  BA
dXA  GB  G
A  B  B
The  signing  of  (10) depends upon  the  signs of  Gij. Assuming
increasing  marginal  costs,  i.e.  Gii  >  0, only  a strongly  negative  relation-
ship  between  costs  for  XA and  for  XB  could  make (10)  positive. That  is,
assuming  that  marginal  costs  for  each  product  are  rising  and  that  increases
in  the  output  o-f  one  product raise, or  at  least  do  not  much reduce,  the
marginal  costs  of the  other, a  forced reduction in  XA  will lead  to an
increase  in  XB.  Competitive  firms will  respond to  a  VER in  market  A by
increasing  sales  in market  B  - the  cause  of  Hamilton's  (1989)  domino
effect,  or in the  terminology  below,  the  "domino  diversion'  of  exports.
Further  substitution  yields
(11)  G  [-  G  2-  H
A  A  iX:B  GEB+~  j-
z10
The  expression  H is  not immediately  interpretable  intuitively,  but
it  may readily  be shown  that  almost certainly H > 0, i.e.  that  a  VER  will
lead  the  industry  to contract.  The  first two  terms  of the  numerator  and
denominator  are  identical  and  negative.  The  final  term  of  the  numerator
will be small  (and possibly positive), thus either  hardly  affecting  (or
possibly  reducing)  thc  absolute  value  of  the  expression,  while  the  effect
of the  final term of  the  denominator  is  negative, so increasing  its
absolute  value.  3/  Only  very  strong interactions  between  products  A and  B
in  production  could  catuse  H to  become negative.  If  we rule  these  out, it
is  plain  that  an enforced fall  in XA  will  also  reduce  the  scale  of the
industry's  operations.  A VER  leads  the  industry  to  contract.
Substituting  (11)  into (5)  and  recalling  the  definitions  of H and
N for  price-  and  wage-taking  firms
(12)  | [  [  +  |  d  Gm  [1M  + N.H]G
The  term  N.H  is  almost  certainly negative, so  we conclude  that  unless  the
difference in  the  elasticities  of  demand between the  restricted  and
unrestricted  markets  is  large  and  favorable,  a *small"  VEk  on a price-  and
wage-taking  industry  boosts  profits.
Equation  (12)  also  illustrates  some  special  cases.
*  If  the  industry  is  genuinely  price-  and  wage-taking,  ei -
profits  are  unaffected  by the  VER.  In fact,  they  are  fixed
at zero  if  we assume  identical  firms.12
*  If  the  industry  is  a  genuine  wage-taker,  e2  Z  U,  there  is  a
presumption  that  the VER is profit-enhanclng,  because  (12)
reduces  to  [(el-(l-H)e§l],  and H  is unlikely  to be  far
dlfferent  from  unity.
*  If  the  elasticLtLes  of demand  are  equal  across  markets,  the
VER  is  certainly  proflt-enhancing  because  H - 0  whlle  N <  0.
*  If  demand in  the  unrestricted  market  is  perfectly  elastic,
CB-  ,  the  VER cannot  harm  profLts.
Figure  1  presents  a  simplified  account  of  the  model  of  this
section.  It  is  drawn  in  factor-factor  price  space.  The  lines HRi report
the  aggregates  of  firms'  marginal  revenues  gained  from  an  extra  unit  of  2
being  devoted  to  producing  for  market  i,  PL/Gj  or  liPl/Gi,  i-A,B  according
to  industry  structure.  MRz  is  their  sum  under  free  trade.  4/ Coupled  with
a  rising  supply  curve  for  Z,  Z  - Z(W),  the  total  marglnal  revenue  function
(MR0) determines  the  vage  rate  (W 0) and  the  size  of  the  industry  (ZO).  It
is  clear  that  at  thls  wage  rate  all  the  first  order  conditlons  are  met.
A When  the  VER  is  imposed  in  A,  it  implies  factor  usage  21. The  VER
causes  the  marginal  revenue  curve to fall to  zero  at  any  higher  level  of
input.  MRB is  unaffected.  The  aggregate  marginal  revenue  function,  MR4.
is  now  kinked,  and  the  new  industry  equilibrium  is  defined  by  W1 and  21.  It
is  plain  that  the  industry  has  contracted,  but  that  at  the  lower  wage more
resources  are  devoted  to  supplying  market  B. It  is also plaln that the
sizes of the varlous  changes  are affected  by  the size  of  the  shock,
A  A  i (21  -ZO),  and  the  slopes  of  the  various  schedules.  The  slopes  of  the MR 2
curves  depend  on  EL,  Gj  and  Gii,  while  the  slope  of  the  factor  supply  func-
tion  depends  on  CZ12
Fiture  1
Z1  ~ ~~  ~  ~~~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~  ZO  (w)t1 
w
MR  z  ~~MR  z  MRa
zA  zA  zB  B  z  z
1  ~~0  1  013
National  Welfare
So  far  we have equated  national  welfare  with  industry  profits.
This  is  plainly  too restrictive. Assuming  that all  industries  in  the
economy  are  competitive,  so that wages represent  marginal  products,  we
approximate  national  welfare  by the sum of profits  (non-zero  only  in
footwear)  and  factor  incomes.
(13)  U - I  +  WL
where  L  is  the  size of the factor  market  from  which  footwear  draws  its
factors.  If  there  are  factors  of types  which  are  not  used  in  the  footwear
industry  they  are  excluded  from  L  and  an  additional  term  should  be  added  to
(13)  to  cover  their  income.  However,  since  this  is  assumed  constant,  we
can  ignore  it.
The  change  in  national  welfare  differs  from  the  change  in  industry
profits  by
(14)  LdW  -LW  dZ zez
This  effect  may  be  added  to  N  in  equation  (5),  so  that  in  the  case
of  price-  and  wage-taking  firms,  the  new  value  of  N  becomes
(15)  N  - 11  1  L - Z (15)  N-- CB  CZ] 14
It is  plain  that  A could  now  be  positive and  that  it is  more likely  to  be
so  the  lower  the  elasticity  of supply  of factors  to footwear  and  the  larger
the  stock of  factors outside  footwear  whose  wage  is  affected by
developments  in the  footwear  sector.  Since the  extension  of the  welfare
criterion  affects  no part  of the  previous  calculations  other  than  N,  we may
straight-forwardly  generalize  (12)  to  write
[[  11  1  L-Z  ~G
(16)  - + 6 B  +6  GA  J
aA  eA  |C  (  B  C  B  eZ  Z  |
This  is  more likely  to be  positive  than  (12)  because  6z  now  enters
with  a positive  sign  and  is  multiplied by a factor  that  may exceed  unity.
All  the  special cases discussed above  follow through to  (16).  An
additional  case  of interest  is where  only  those  factors  initially  in  the
footwear  industry  enter  the  welfare  criterion.  This  implies that  one  is
considering  the  effect  of the  VER  on  the  industry  (workers  and  entrepre-
neurs)  as a  whole.  In  this case (16) collapses  to  e 6 ' - (1-H)  lB,  -which
is likely  to  be negative  unless  demand  in  the  restricted  market  (A)  is sig-
nificantly  more elastic  than  demand  in the  unrestricted  market  (B).  5/
Further  manipulation  allows  us to rewrite  A as
L  B  7N 15
wheret  eN  is  the  elasticity  of demand  for  factors  with  respect  to  the  wage
in  the  non-footwear  sectors  using L, EN  c  0.  This  expression  would  be
relevant  to  an  assessment  of  a  footwear  VER  because  if  the  total  stock  of
factors  were  fixed,  then the change  in the supply  of factors  to  the
footwear  industry  would  merely  be  the opposlte  of  the  change  in  the  demand
for  them  elsewhere.  With  this  definition  of  B,  our  final  welfare  criterion
becomes:
(17) dAK1-I+[u  HIGA
ditA  C  A  CB  IE  E  8  N  |
Intuitively,  (17) suggests  that the effects  of a  VER depends  on  an
allocation  component  and  a  size component. The  allocation  component  asks
whether switching  output  between  markets  is beneficial  and the  size
component  whether  switching  factors  between  sectors  is  beneficial.  61
To  recapitulate,  equations  (16)  and  (17)  suggest  that  an  empirical
estimate  of  the  welfare  effects  of  a  VER  must  consider:
*  the  elasticities  of demand  in restricted  and  unrestricted
markets;
*  the  elasticity  of  factor  supply  to  the  affected  industry  or
the  elasticity  of  factor  demand  elsewhere  in  the  economy;  and
*  the  parameters  of the production  function  or  factor  input
process.16
So far,  we have  analyzed  the  effects of  a VER  entirely  in primal
terms,  dealing  directly  with  the  parameters of the  demand  and  production
functions. That  approach  is  useful both in  its  intuitive  transparency  and
in its  ability  to  deal with  non-price-taking  behaviour. Once  we come  to
estimation  however,  it is  less powerful than  working  with dual  functions.
Since  in section  3  we  exploit duality and  flexible  functional  forms  to
specify our  output/allocation  equations,  we  briefly restate our  main
results  in those  terms  here.  It turns  out  that  the  crucial  derivatives  Gij
may  be  signed in  terms of  estimable parameters  based  on dual  profit
functions.
The  empirical application  of  duality requires price-taking
behaviour. Thus  we are  considering  a  new  approach  only  to the  evaluation
of dXg  and  dZ and  the  variables  dependent  upon  them. The  evaluation  of the
factors  H and  N is  unchanged  by  the  switch  to duality. For  a  price-taking
firm  the  profit  function  governing  the  production  and  allocation  of exports
may  be  written  as f  - 1(PA, PB,  W), and  using  Sheppard's  lemma,  the  profit
function  yields  consistent  output  supply and  input  demand  functions. For
the  sake  of concreteness,  we  represent the  profit  function  by Diewert's
(1974)  Generalized  Leontief  form  used in  the  remainder  of the  paper.
(18)  _  E 7ij  (-Pi/ 2 p3/2)
where  i - A, B, Z and  Pz  is  just the  wage (W). Concavity  of the  profit
function  requires  7ij  - 7ji  and  7ij >  0  i  t  j  if outputs  (XA,  XB)  are
measured with  positive signs  and  inputs (Z) with  negative signs.17
Differentiating  (18)  yields the  general  netput equation  ('netputs'  are
both inputs  and  outputs)
(19)  Xi'  7ii  E  7i  (p  /pi)
where  XZ - -Z in  our  earlier  notation.
Neary  and  Roberts  (1980) show that  a  constrained  equilibrium  can
be expressed  in terms of  the  parameters  of the  unconstrained  compensated
demand  or supply  functions  by  means  of virtual  prices. Virtual  prices  are
the  prices  at  which  the  actual quantities traded  would  have  been  traded
voluntarily  according to  the  compensated  functions.  For  unconstrained
netputs,  virtual  prices  equal  actual  prices,  and  for  constrained  netputs
they  may  be derived  by inverting  the  compensated  netput  functions. Solving
(19)  for  ;A,  the  virtual  price  of sales  to  market A  given  a value  of  XA,
and  substituting  into  the  two  unconstrained  netput  functions  yields:
(20)  Xk  7kk  7kA  I  7kl  7kA 7A1  ]  p  k,l-B.Z
(XA  + 7AA)  (XA  +  7AMA)  k
Now  at the  initial,  unconstrained,  equilibrium (X, X,  Z*), (20)
will  hold  as  well as  (19),  so  that  to calculate  the  effects  of a wsmall'
VER,  we need only  differentiate  (20)  w.r.t.  XA.  This  simply  indicates  that




which,  given  the  sign  convention,  shows tAat a  VER  in  market  A will  boost
supplies  to  market  B  and  reduce  factor  inputs,  2. That  is,  the  assumptions
necessary  to ensure  the concavity  of the generalized  Leontief  profit-
function  are  sufficient  to sign expressions  (10) and (11)  above  if  the
duality  requirement  that  IeBI  - 1ezl - S  is  satisfied.  But  once  they  are
signed  under  these  conditions,  (10) and (11)  may be  signed  (in  the  same
direction)  for  all  valuis  of the elasticities,  so  concavity  is  sufficient
to establish  a  general  result  of  'domino  diversion"  and *industry
contraction'  in  response  to  a  VER.
Using  this  approach,  the  quantification  of  the  effects  of  the  VER
depends  on  both the parameters  of the profit  function  and  the  various
industry  elasticities,  and  apparently  cannot  be further  simplified  as  we
did  with  the  primal  analysis  above.  As a  practical  application,  we  now
estimate  as  many  of  the  parameters  as possible  and  use  a simulation  model
to  combine  the  estimates.  Using a  simulation  model  has  the  additional
virtue  of  allowing  us  to  consider  non-marginal  VERs  as  well.
III. ESTIMATION
In  this  section  we  describe  two  attempts  to  estimate  the  principal
parameters  of  the  model above for Taiwanese  exports  of  leather  footwear
(CCCN  6402).  Most  Taiwanese  footwear  exports  are  sold  in  the  USA,  which
between  July 1977 and June 1981 imposed  on them a  voluntary  export
restraint  (the  so-called  Orderly,  Marketing  Agreement).  The  OMA  has  been
investigated  several  times  from the USA's point of  view  --  e.g.  Pearson
(1983)  and  Aw  and Roberts  (1986)  --  but not, to our  knowledge,  from
Taiwan's.  We  estimate  the model for leather  footwear  sales  because  they
were  all  affected  by  the OMA, whereas  the  other  major  aggregate  available19
to  us (CCCN  6401), although accounting  for  a  larger  share  of Taivanese
footwear  exports,  comprises rubber and  plastic footwear, the  former  of
which  was  not  limited  by the  OHA. We distinguish  two  markets  for  footwear,
the  USA  and  the  rest  of  the  world  and  use  quarterly  data  1974-1986.  7/
We estimate the various parameters  of  the  model  presented  in
section  II in  a  simultaneous  system of non-linear  equations  using  three
stage iterative  instrumental variable  methods  from SAS's SYSNLIN
proce'ures.  8/  The  purpose of  this estimation  is  to  establish  the
plausibility  of uur  approach and  to  obtain "ball-park'  estimates  of the
critical  parameters  for  later policy simulations.  Thus we  have  not
experimented  with large numbers of  specifications  nor  have  we concerned
ourselves  much about insignificant  but  implausible  estimates of  non-
critical  parameters.
Our  first  attempt  at  estimation  was  a limited  one. Recognizing
the  paucity  of data  on  the  production  side of the  model,  we estimated  a
system  comprising  only demand curves and an  export  allocation  model  to
divide  a given volume of  exports between markets.  We had  originally
intended  to  use  a  constant elasticity  of transformation  (CET)  allocation
model --  see de  Melo  and  Winters  (1989) --  but it has the unfortunate
property  of  obliging  GAB from equation (10) above to  be  negative. This
immediately  implies  that  a  VER  in  A  will  contract  sales  to  market  B in  the
fully  price-taking  case.  Therefore,  in  order  to avoid  imposing  such  an
implication,  and  to  allow  the  data scope to determine  the  nature  of  the
spillover,  we derived  an  alternative  allocation  model  from  the  restricted
profit  function  of  the  Generalized  Leontief form given  by equation  (18)
above.
McFadden and  Fuss  (1978) show that profit functions  can  be
rewritten  to  describe  the maximum profit  available  given  exogenous  values20
for  certain  netputs.  They  show that  such  restricted  profit  functions  must
be  linear  homogeneous  in  the  exogenous  quantities  and  should  be  concave  in
the  prices  of  the remaining  unconstrained  netputs. Hence,  we  fix  total
inputs  (Z)  exogenously  and  proxy  Z,  by  total  exports  of  footwear  CX),  as  an
allocation  model  suggests  is appropriate. This allows  us  to  write  XA  -
f(PA,PB)*X,  which,  using  a  Generalized  Leontief  form,  specializes  to
(21)  XAIX  - - A  7AB (PB/P)
The  corresponding  equation  for  XB  is  implicit  in  (21)  given  adding  up.
Equation  (21)  was estimated  along  with demand  functions  for
leather  footwear  for  the  USA  and for the rest of  the  world. These  were
normalized  to  express  the  price  of Taiwanese  footwear  relative  to  a  linear
combination  of  the prices  of locally  produced  footwear  (Pi)  and  Korean
exports  to the market  concerned (PI)  as the dependent  variable.
Normalizing  the  demand  curve  on  price  is necessary  if  the  data  are  to  have
the  opportunity  to  record  infinitely  elastic  demands. The  additional
explanatory  variables  were a  cyclical  variable  (the  index  of  industrial
production,  Qi)  and  the  quantity  of exports. Thus  the  two  demand  curves
were  of  the  form:
(22)  Pi  ' (Pi  + Pi Qi  + piX  )  t(l  _ p3i  L  P3 PKi]  i  - A,B p  (A+±f+A  i  2L  P  i
All  three  equations  were given seasonal  dummies  and,  ln  view  of
the  evident  serial  correlation  when  estimated  straightforwardly,  were  also
adjusted  for  first  order  serial  correlation.21
During  the  OMA  the  demand  equations  still  applied,  relating  actual
prices  and  quantities,  but  the  allocation function  was over-ridden  by the
VER  and  its  implication,  given  Z,  for  sales  Xg.  Thus  the  quarters  1977:3
to 1981:2  had  to be removed from  the  estimation  of equation  (21).9/ The
set  of instrumental  variables  included  the  exogenous  variables  used  in (21)
and (22). The initial  estimates  of  (22)  were  highly  unstable: the  serial
correlation  coefficients fluctuated  around unity  and  consequently  the
resolution  on the  constant terms P  was  very weak.  The  only  solution
appeared  to  be to  estimate the  demand  equations  in  first  difference  form,
dropping  the  constants. Table  1 reports  these  results  as  model  1.
The  most  striking feature of model  I  is  its  strong  positive
estimate  of  'yAB:  given  total  exports  the  share  allocated  to  market  A rises
strongly  as their  relative price  rises.  This  result  is sufficient  to
indicate  negative  spillovers  between  markets --  i.e. that  GAB  >  0  --  and
consequently  that  both "domino  diversion'  and  'industry  contraction'  occur,
albeit  the  latter  via  an indirect route.  The  elasticity  of the  USA share
of exports  with respect  to its  price  implied  by the  estt.mate  is  about  3.5
in 197617;  that  is,  holding total exports constant,  a it  increase  in the
price  available  in the  USA  would  have  increased  exports  to the  USA  by 3.52.
On the  demand  side,  the  results  indicate  that  the  USA's  demand  for
Taiwanese  footwear  is insensitive  to  the  state of the  business  cycle  and
appears  to be related  only  to local  footwear  prices  rather  than  to those  of
competing  suppliers  from  Korea.  The  price  is,  however,  negatively  related
to the  quantity  of exports  with  an elasticity  of about  -14  evaluated  at the
mean levels  of exports  and  prices in  the  year  prior  to the  OMA (1976:3  -
1977:2).  10/  The  demand in  the  rest of  the world  seems  to  be fairly
strongly  influenced  by the  state of  demand (prices  rise  with the  cycle),22
Table  ls  ESTIMATES  OF SUPPLY  AND DEMAND  FUNCTIONS
FOR TAIWANESE FOOTWEAR
Model I a/  Model II b/
7A  M-4.67  (1.81)  -
7AB  4.31  (2.14)  1.32  (0.90)
7AZ  - 0.49  (0.19)
7YBB  -
73Bz  -0.05  0.09
p  0.87  (0.12)  1.00  (-)
0.0003  (0.0094)  0.0010 (n.0080)
-0.0016 (0.0018)  0.0009  (0.0012)
-0.308  (0.366)  -0.087  (0.242)
1  0.0389 (0.0564)  -0.0031  (0.0519)
0.0108 (0.0130)  0.0073  (0.0103)
0.5941 (0.171)  0.625  (0.147)
R2/DW
XA  0.903  1.93  0.964  1.89
XB  - - 0.958  2.06
PA  0.985  1.86  0.988  2.08
PB  0.955  2.46  0.965  2.52
Notes:
a/  See text and equation (22).
bi  See text and equations (19)  and (20).23
and  to  be related to  the prices of both  local  footwear  and  competitive
footwear  from Korea.  The  positive  term on  exports is  very  fragile,
depending  on  the  dynamics  of  the  equation  system,  it is  best  interpreted  as
indicating  a  horizontal  demand curve rather than a  perverse  one. Thus
comparing  the  USA  market  in  which Taiwan  is  an important  supplier  with  the
world market  in  which  it  is  less so  we find  a lower elasticity  of  demand
(-14  vs.  -U)  and  less  direct  competition  for  Korea. This  seems  intuitively
plausible.  Omitting  the  two  implausible  coefficients  (  4  and  Pi)  has  little
effect  on  the  other  parameter3  except  for  increasing  absolutely  7AA  and  7AB
by  about 0.25.  Finally,  the RZ  and Durbin-Watson  statistics  are
acceptable.
The  second  estimatior.  exercise  attempts  to  incorporate  the  size  of
the  industry  into  the  system of  estimating  equations.  As argued  above,
this  is  most  0ap'ly  accomplished  by  means of  the  profit  function.  Thus  in
addition  to  the  two demand curves (22), we  attempted  to  estimate  three
supply  functions:  equations  (19)  for  i  =  A,B  and  (20)  for  i-B. Equations
(19)  rule  during  periods  of free trade and  equations  (20)  during  the  OMA.
The  factor  demand  equation,  (19)  with  i-Z,  is  not  estimable  because  no  data
exist  on factor  inputs,  but  with  the exception  of lzz,  its  parameters  are
recoverable  from the  other equations  by  symmetry.  If  the  stochastic
behaviour  of the  supply  model  is  unaffected  by the  OMA,  the  error  structure
of (20) is derivable from that of  (19). 11/  However, it  would  be
exceedingly  complex  to  do  this, as Winters and  Brenton  (1988)  have  shown
using  other  functional  forms,  so  it  seemed  most  rational  to treat  (20)  as  a
separate  equation  with  its  own  stochastic  errors.
We approached  the  incorporation  of  supply iesponses  with  great
trepidation. The  factor price data necessary for equations  (19)  are
available  only  on  ISIC rather than on  SITC  commodity  classificarions  and24
refer  only  to  wages. Data  were  also  available  to us  only  annually  for  the
earlier  part  of  our sample,  and  thus  had to  be interpolated  into  quarterly
series. Moreover,  it  is  possible that  wages  are  endogenous.  Hence,  wages
have  to be instrumented  in  our  estimation  procedure. For  instruments,  we
used  employment  and  wages  in  the whole  of Taiwanese  manufacturing.  Thus,
one  should not  place  great reliance on  the  results of  the  expanded
estimation.
The results  of the  full estimation are  reported  as  model  II of
table  1.  As previously,  severe serial  correlation  suggested  that  working
in  first  differences  was  a  necessary simplification,  but  this  time  it
affected  all  equations. This  made  it impossible  to  estimate  the  constants
of the  supply  functions  which,  in  turn, meant  that  (20)  was inestimable.
Thus  our  final  system comprised four rather than  five  equations. The
estimates  of the  demand  functions are  even less  well  defined  in  model  II
than  in  model  I;  the  only notable change  is  that  the  coefficient  relating
prices  to the  quantities  of exports  in the  USA  is insignificantly  positive.
As before,  we interpret this as  indicating  a  horizontal  not  an  upward-
sloping  demand  curve.
Turning  to  the  supply  responses,  we  find  them  reduced  by  the
inclusion  of  factor  prices. For  sales to  the  USA --  the  major  market  --
both terms  are  positive:  exports to  the  USA  depend  positively  on their
price  relative  to the  prices of  both  sales  elsewhere  and  factor  inputs.
The  implied arc  elasticity of  supply is  around 3.1  in  1977.  The
coefficients  on relative  prices  for  exports to  the  rest  of the  world  are
positive  relative  to  the  price  of  USA  sales  but  just  negative  relative  to
factor  inputs. The  latter  sign implies  implausible  behavious  at some  sets
of prices,  but  does  not  disturb  the  signs  of the  elasticities  at the  prices25
experienced  over  our  sample  period. The  own  price  elasticity  of supply  for
exports  to the  rest  of the  world  is  about  1.0  in  1977,  but grows  to 1.5  by
1986.
The  results for  model  II  are  disappointing  in  their  lack  of
precision. However,  they  do  suggest  that  important  supply  responses  exist
and  that  a  more  detailed  study with  better  data  would  be rewarding. They
also  suggest  that  responses are  around the  levels  suggesting  that  it is
fruitful  to study  the  effects of  VERs  on resource  allocation  and  welfare.
Thus,  until  firmer  empirical  work is  undertaken,  we take  the  estimates  here
as  bases  from which  to  explore the  effects of  different  elasticity
assumptions  on the  costs  of  VERs  to  developing  country  exporters.
IV.  WELFARE  AND  DISTRIBUTIONAL  EFFECTS OF VERS:  SOME  ILLUSTRATIVE
SIMULATIONS.
The  econometric  estimates  in  section  3  for  Taiwanese  leather
footwear exports  suggest  that  factor  demand  and  output supply
responsiveness  are  sufficient to  produce "domino diversion" towards
unrestricted  markets  and  industry contraction.  However,  both  because  we
were  unable  to estimate  precisely  all  the  demand  and  supply  parameters,  and
because  our  estimates are  not  representative  of  those  in  other  sectors
subject to  VERs, we  complete the  analysis with  some counterfactual
simulations  inspired by  our  earlier results.  We  loosely ba6e these
simulations  on Taiwanese  leather  footwear  exports  to the  USA  and  to the  ROW
using  volume and  price data  at  the  eve  of  the  OMA  agreement. The
simulations  are  drawn  by  applying elasticities  to the  partial  equilibrium
model  developed  in section  2.  The  notation is  the  same,  and  the  set  of
equations  describing  output demand and  factor  supply  responses  (constant26
elasticity  demand  curves  and  constant elasticity supply  for  the  factor  of
production)  are  detailed in  the  appendix along *;ith  the  calibration
procedure. The  output  supply  and  factor  demand  functions  are  modelled  with
the  generalized  Leontief  form, but  they  are  expressed  below  in terms  of
elasticities  for  the  sake  of intuitive  transparency.
The  results of  simulations  under different assumptions  about
demand  and  supply  elasticities  are  reported in  table  _..  All simulations
refer  to a  negotiated 10  percent cut  in  exports of Taiwanese  leather
footwear  to the  USA.  The  objective of the  simulations  is  to establish  how
sensitive  the  results  are  to  systematic  variations in  demand  and  supply
elasticities.  At this  stage,  we assume  that  the  footwear  industry  is small
in  the  market  for  its  factor Z,  so  that Pz,  the  price  of the  factor  is
fixed.
In  all  the  simulations,  we  rely on  pairwise  variations  in  the
parameters  of  the  Generalized  Leontief production function.  For  all
pairwise  variations, the  conditions for  local concavity of the  profit
function  (i.e.  7ij  >  0) are  met,  as suggested  by our  econometric  estimates.
At this  stage,  all  simulations  assume  identical  pairwise  supply  and  demand
elasticities,  since  we have  no  a  priori ground  for  presuming  that  supply
elasticities  tv restricted  and  unrestricted  markets  should  be different  or
for  presuming  that  export demand elasticities  should  be different  (unless
market  shares  in  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  markets  are radically
different).
As was  established  in  section  2, the  simulations  in  columns  1 to 3
show that  the  spillover is  an  increasing  function of  export  demand
elasticities.  The results  of  varying  export  demand  elasticities  also  show
that,  other  things  equal,  the  rent transfer gain  decreases  as the  size  ofTable  2:  SENSITIVITY RESULTS  TO ELASTICITY  SPECIFICATION (SMALL  INDUSTRY  CASE)
(1OX  REDUCTION  IN  EXPORTS  TO  RESTRICTED  MARKET)  /
ElnsticitilesColumn  (1)  (2)  (J)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Factor  dmand  elasticity
d
(Ex)  y  -1  -1  -1  -1/4  -1/4  -1/4  -2  -2  -2
Output  *upply  elasticities
5  5
(CA UO)SI  2  2  2  1/2  1/2  1/2  4  4  4
Export  damand  elasticitios
d  d
(C  EAEE)  1/2  2  4  1/2  2  4  1/2  2  4
Exports  to  unrestricted  market
(  change)  0.016  0.03o  0.046  0.034  0.049  0.068  0.009  0.026  0.086
Factor  uso  (X  change)  -0.068  -0.045  -0.041  -0.041  -0808U  -0.034  -0.056  -0.06  -0.045
Change In  profits  I/  7.964  1.452  0.692  6.702  0.989  0.259  8.875  1.649  0.708
Change In  Ovirtusl'  profits  I/  -J.287  -2.709  -2.420  -9.699  -7.997  -7.641  -1.778  -1.640  -1.881
!/  Initial  values  PA  z  1.54;  XA  a  27.5;  P 8 e  1.26;  Xg  =  22.0. Small  Industry  cse,  i.e.  Pz fixed.
k  Holding  output  prices  constant.
s/  Holding  Pz constant.
i/  Initial  profits  equal  to  zero.  Change in  sales  revenue  minus  change  In  value  of  factor  input.
/  Initial  profit.  equal  to  zsro. Restricted  profits  evaluated  at  virtual  prics.28
the  spillover  increases. This  is  because  with  more spillover  there  is  less
contraction  which  in turn  reduces  industry  profits.
More  interesting  are  the  results of  varying factor  demand  and
output  supply  elasticities.  Raising  output  supply  response  alone  increases
the  spillover  and  hence  reduces profit to  the  industry  as there  is less
contraction.  This  negative effect on  industry profits  is offset  if  the
elasticity  of demand  for  the  factor of  production  is raised. Doubling  the
olasticity  of factor  demand  approximately  halves  the  size  of the  spillover
effect.  Holding export  demand elasticities  constant, doubling all
production  function  elasticities  (col.  3  to  col.  9) reduces  the  spillover
effect by  about  50  percent and  increases  marginally the  amount of
contraction  and  hence  profits.
As  we saw  in section  2 and  in  figure  i, as a result  of the  VER  MRt
. 0  while  HRI  is unaffected.  Breaking  the  equality  of  marginal  revenues  of
the  industry factor between sales to  the  restricted and  unrestricted
markets  creates an  inefficiency.  A  measure of  that  inefficiency  is
provided  by  industry profits evaluated at  'virtual" profits. Virtual
prices  are  the  set  of  prices which would  cause  actual  quantities  to  be
supplied  voluntarily  - i.e., the  set of  prices which,  with  maximizing
behaviour,  would  support  the  observed  quantity  outcome. Given  such  prices,
"virtual'  profits are  the maximum that exporters could  earn  and  thus
represent  the  efficiency  losses  that the  VER  imposes. In the  absence  of
the  VER,  actual  profits  equal virtual profits,  *both  being  equal  to  zero.
As can  be seen  from  the  last row  of  table 2,  virtual  profits  are  more
negative  - i.e.  efficiency  losses  are  greater  - the  lower  demand  and  supply
elasticities.29
In practice,  however, industries  that  enter  into VERs  are  not
small  in their  domestic economy.  Indeed, it is  precisely  because  these
industries  have  been  rapidly gaining market shares  in  developed-country
markets,  that  VER  arrangements  are  negotiated  in  the  first  place. In table
3, therefore,  we report  on allocation and  welfare  effects  of the  same  VER
reduction  as for  three  sets  of  elasticities  selected  from  table  2, but  now
recognizing  that  the  industry  faces  an  upward  sloping  supply  curve  for  its
factor,  Z, so that  contraction  is accompanied  by a fall  in the  wage of the
industry  factor,  Pz  Because  the  share  of the  ine-kstry  in the  market  for  Z
is  likely to  vary  from case  to  case, we  report welfare  effects  for
different  assumptions  about  the  size  of  the  industry  in  the  factor  market.
Welfare  calculations  are  reported  in the  bottom  of table  3 as a  percentage
of the income  of factors  in  the  industry prior  to the  VER and  for  factor
market  sizes  ranging  from  1 to  20  times  the  initial  allocation  of factors
in  the industry.  Of  course, the  elasticity of  factor supply  to the
industry  is  not  independent  of its  siza  in  the  market  for  factors  so  that
the  welfare estimate grid  should be  interpreted  accordingly  with  high
values  of the  elasticity  of factor supply  corresponding  to cases  where  the
industry  is small  in the  market  for  its  factors. For  example,  elasticities
of factor  supply  in the  range between 1  and  5 and  factor  market  sizes  in
the  range  between  1  and  5  times the  initial  factor  allocation,  could  be
taken  as representative  for  analyzing a  VER  in  textiles. On the  other
hand,  for  a smaller industry like footwear, a  more likely  factor  supply
elasticity  range  would  be between 5  and  10  with a  correspondingly  higher
range  for  the  size of  the  factor market in  relation to the  footwear
industry.Table:  DISTIONAL  AND  WELFAtE  EFFECS  OF A VEt
Factor  Eua.lh  Elasticity  a  I  Fsctor  Susely  Elasticity  *  S  Factor  Sumal.  Elalliciti  *  10  Factor  Sumalw  Elsticity  *
El_eiciti..  Los 5/  l4eidus  1/  High  I/  Law &/  l  ium  High &/  Low j/  NWI u-  si  High  j/  Low M/  Medium  hi  HisI  S/
bmp.rl  to  w,re.tri  cld
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Feetor  mm  (5  change)  -0.0W  -0.068  -0.02?  -0.041  -0.042  -0.0  0  -0.041  -0.048  -043  4.08  0.045  -0.045
Factor  price  (U  champ)  -0.069  -0.08  4.0=  -0.006  -. 009  -. 00  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  0.0  0.0  0.0
Change  in  profits  6.849  8.302  2.196  7.1I  1.924  1.186  6.936  1.696  0.947  0.987  1.452  0.708
cane  in  Vrtual
prof  to  i-.451  -1.775  -o.647  -9.429  -2.472  -1.162  -9.568  -2. S6  -1.265  -7. nr  -2.709  -1.3J1
Change  in  welfare  1/()0.009  0.014  0.006  0.094  0.019  0.006  0.098  0.020  0.009  0.0  0.0  0.0 0°  2068  0.120  4 .108  0  o.6  -40i  015  0.24  °.078  °  0  00  0.0 (10)4257  40.267  4.:287  0.020  4.:066  4.0:0  0.0607  4.00020  4.0800  0.:0  0.0  0.00 (2  04.  641  40.621  4O.60  40.063  4.14.1413  001  4060.078  0.0  0.0  0.0
J/  S6..  elaticitige  a.  tole  B.  colum  S.
hi  See  eluatlcitiges  table  S,  colum  2.
S/  Sa_  *lastI  citie.  - tahle  8.  coluu  9.
O  j/  Itiera  is  parenthoee.  refer  to  factor  *rket  size  ;i  relation  to  initial  factor  allocation  In  the  industry.  Change in
welfare  calculated  fm  equation  (M4  and eapr.aaed  so  a  percentage  of  initial  factor  incme  in  the  industry  before  the Vgt.31
With  wage flexibility  the  distributional  effects  of a VER  are  more
pronounced  than  earlier.  Industry profits rise relatively  more as they
shed  factors  and  use  remaining  factors  at  a lower  wage.  Taking  the  medium
elasticity scenario as  a  reference,  with  an  industry factor supply
elasticity  of 5, profits rise by  30  percent more  than  in the  case  of
infinite  supply  elasticity,  and  industry  wages  fall by one  percent. In
addition  to producing  re-deployment,  a  VER raises  profits  and  lowers  wages.
Thus  it  has  a strong  adverse  effect  on the  distribution  of income.
The  harmful  effects  of  a  VER, however, are  not  confined  to  the
adverse  distributional  shifts  arising  frr  l higher  profits,  lo0%r  wages  and
lower  factor  use.  In addition, as  can  be  seen  from  the  grid  of  welfare
changes  displayed  in  the  bottom of  table 3, for  most factor  market  sizes
and for  factor  supply  elasticities  of  below  10,  the  VER results  in  a net
welfare  loss. For  example,  with medium  elasticities  as a reference,  a  VER
reducing  exports  to  the  restricted  market by  10  percent  would  lead  to  a
welfare  loss  of 12  percent  of factor  income  (prior  to the  VER) for  a factor
supply  elasticity  of 1  and  a factor market  5 times  the  size  of the  initial
factor  allocation in  the  industry.  Of  course, higher factor  supply
elasticities  mitigate  the  welfare loss and  so  would  differential  export
demand  elasticities (with relatively lower demand elasticities in  the
restricted  market). However,  the  results in  the  bottom  of table  3 suggest
that  for  most plausible elasticity configurations,  a  VER is  more likely
than  not  to reduce  national  welfare  in  the  exporting  country.
6.  Conclusions
The  bulk  of the  economic  literature  gives  the  impression  that  VERs
are  not  very  harmful  for  the  exporting country. Most  work on the  subject
has focused  on  establishing  the  welfare lose to  th  4mporti-g  country32
arising  from  the  conjunction  of an  income  transfer  loss  and  a  distortionary
efficiency  loss. Implicit  in  that work  is  that  the  exporting  country  is
likely  to receive  adequate  compensation  for  any  induced  inefficiency  losses
through  the  often  large  rent  transfer.
This  paper  has  argued  that this view  is  misconceived.  A fairly
general  theoretical  model  of the  industry subject to the  VER shows  that  a
VER  is  likely to  lead to  both  industry contraction  and spillover  to
unrestricted  export  markets. We call  spillover  "domino  diversion'  since  it
lends  support  to the  preoccupation  of  countries  that  have  not  negotiated
VERs with  seeing their markets flooded by  sales diverted from  the
restricted  markets.  Our  econometric  estimates for  Taiwanese  leather
footwear  exports  to the  USA  lend support  to the  fairly  general  conditions
under  which spillover  and  industry  contraction  will occur,  namely  that  with
rising  marginal  costs  in  the  production of  sales  to both  restricted  and
unrestricted  markets,  any  increase  in  the  output of one  product  does  not
reduce  much (or  increases)  the  marginal  cost  of the  other  product.
We also  establish  that unless there  are  very strong  interactions
in  production  between  the  products sold  to  the  restricted  and  unrestricted
markets,  a VER will  lead to  industry  contraction,  rising  private  profits
(because  of the  rent transfer from abroad), and  a  lower  wage for  the
factors  employed  in the  industry, especially those with skills  with few
alternative  uses  in  other  industries.  Thus VERs  have  strongly  negative
distributional  implicatwons  for  exporting countries as  profits  rise  and
wages  and  employment  fall. Finally,  illustrative  simulations  show  that  for
a plausible  range of  elasticities  and  relative sizes  of the  restricted
industry,  national  welfare  may  well fall  in spite  of the  rent  transfer  from
abroad.33
Notes
1/  See  e.g.  Greenaway  and  Hindley (1985), Tarr  and  Morkre  (1984),  and
Feenstra  (1984).
2/  The  assumption  that  all  output is exported simplifies  the  welfare
analysis  since  only producer surplus need  be  considered.  In the
following,  we assumD  that society's objective function  is  merely  to
maximize  industry  profits. This  assumption  is  relaxed  below.
3/  The second order conditions for  profit maximization require  that
either  or both (GBB/GB - GBA/GA) or  (GAAIGA  - GAB/Gg)  be positive.
Thus  the  numerator  of (11)  is  unlikely  to  become  positive.
4/  A  restriction  of  the  diagram is  that marginal costs  for  the  two
products  are  unrelated  - i.e.  GAB  - 0.  If that  were  not true,  the
location  of  MR*  would  depend  on ZB,  etc.
5/  This  case is  not  the  same  as assuming  that  the  industry  size  is fixed,
i.e.  that  dZ-0. The  case  considered  here  is less  likely  to show  the
VER as  harmful  because  it  allows  for  the  factors  initially  employed  in
footwear  to  find  useful  employment  elsewhere  in  the  economy  albeit  at
a  lower  wage.
6/  The  alloLation  component  essentially  compares  the  marginal  revenues
(1+6il)  available  to factors  in  different  markets. If it  is  higher  in
other  industries than in  footwear, diversion to  the  former is
beneficial.
7/  We assume  that  all  output  is  exported  and  that  the  exports  to the  rest
of the  world  are  not  constrained.
8/  The  exogenous data plus  time and  seasonal dummies were  used  as
instruments.  Data  sources  and  data  manipulation  to  obtain  a quarterly
wage series  are  described  in the  appendix.
9/  When  the  serial  correlation  adjustment  was  made,  1981:3  also  had  to  be
dropped  because  no unrestricted  lagged value  of  XA  was available  from
1981:2. For  the  omitted  quarter,  actual  values  of XA and  Xg were  used
in  equation  (22)  because  they  were the  exogenous.
10/  Our  estimate of  the  US  price  elasticity of  demand  for  Taiwanese
footwear  may  appear  on the  high  side. For  example,  Aw (1989)  reports
an average  price  elasticity  of  demand of  about  3.0,  a result  higher
than  previous  global  estimates  (Szenberg  et al.  1977).
11/  The  term (XA  +  7A  ) in (20)  will  become  (XA  +  7A  - uA)  where  uA is an
error  term  distributed  identically  throughout  our  sample  period.
12/  For  evidence  that  wages  and  output  fall  (relative  to industry  trends)
in the  case  of  VERs  on  Korean footwear exports, see  de  Melo and
Winters  (1989).34
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Appendix:
Al.  Data  Sources  for  Econometric  Estimates
Exports  and  export  unit  values:  Foreign  Trade  of China,  Taiwan  Province
CCN 6402;  pairs  and  USS  per  pair
Korean  export  unit  values:  Korean  Customs  data  - see  de  Helo and
Winters  (1989)  for  details
Domestic  prices/unit  values:  US:  Bureau  of Census  Current  Industrial
Report  non-rubber  footwear
RoW:  British  Footwear Manufacturers
Federation,  UK domestic  production  unit
value  and  I.F.S. average  exchange  rate
(rf)
Indices  of industrial  production:  F
I.F.S.
Wholesale  prices:  j RoW  - OECD  less  USA  weighted  by GDP
-weights
Exchange  rate:
Wages  and  unemployment:  Yearbook  of  Labor  Statistics,  Republic
of  China  wages  and  employment in
leather  footwear and  average  exchange
rate
All  data  were quarterly  except for  Taiwanese  wages  and  employment
for  which  only  annual data were  available consistent form. These  were
interpolated  into  quarterly  series  as follows.
We assume  each  series  grows by  a constant  amount  throughout  each
I'
year.  Thus  in any  year:
qtj =  xt +  (j - 2.5) yt  j=1...4; t=l...n
where  qtj  is the  observation  for  quarter  j  year  t
xt is  the  annual  observation
Yt is the  quarterly  growth  in  year  t
Observation  xt is  centered  between  quarters  2 and  3 and  qtj  at the
centers  of their  respective  quarters.36
In addition,  there  is  a  requirement  that  the  continuous  function
represented  by x connect  at the  end  of  each  year  and  at the  beginning  of
the  next. Thus
xt  +  2 yt  - xt+l  - 2 Yt+l
from  which
2yt  +  2 yt+l  - xt+l  - xt  m Axt+l
Writing  this  in  matrix  form  yieldst
2 0  ......  0
2 2 0  .... 0  d
0 2 2 0 ..  0
(Al)  ..  y  - Ax
o  ....  0 2 2
where  d is  an arbitrary  starting  condition.
(A.1)  is  solvable  once  d is  known and  we choose  d to  minimize  the  variance
in  growth  rates  - i.e.  we choose  to  make the  quarterly  series  qtj  as smooth
a%i  possible.
Minimizing  y'y  w.r.t. d  yields:
d  =  - [tJ2  Axt  (mtl  +  mit)]  /  2mll
where  mij is  an element  of  M, and  MuN'N,  wshere  N is the  matrix  in (A.1).
A2.  Simulation  Model  A
The  results  in section 4  are  based  on simulations  calibrated  to
volumes  and  unit  values  of Taiwanese  leather  footwear  exports  at  the  eve  of
the  OMA.  The simulations  are  based  on solutions  derived  from  the  equations
system  below.  Subacripts  k,  k  e  A,  B  refers to  the  demands  in the
restricted  and  unrestricted  markets  respectively.  Subscripts  i  and  J, i,  j
a  A, B, Z refer  to the  two  outputs  and  the  single  composite  input  Z, in  the
Generalized  Leontief  production  function which  describes  technology.  Bars37
over  a  variable  indicate  an  exogenous parameter,  stars  denote  the  initial
unconstrained  equilibrium,  and  a tilde over  a  variable,  ",  refers  to the
prices  at  which  unconstrained  producers would  replicate the  input  and
output  allocation  decisions  imposed  on  them by  binding  constraints  in  the
relevant  market.
(A2)  Xk _  3  pek  k  >  ;  k  e A,B
k  e
(A3)  X  z2A  z  pz  ;Pz -P  ;  e,  0
S  z  z  z  312
(A6)  Xi  -7ii  -33  7ij  (P  /;  ;  i,  j  e  A, B, Z
(A5)  P. < PA  where  XA < XA
Equations  (A2)  and  (A3) describe the  output demand  and  factor
supply  curves  facing the  all,around  price-taking firms in the  industry
subject  to  the  VER.  Equation (M)  is  obtained  from  applying  Sheppard's
lemma  to the  generalized  Leontief  restricted  profit  function
(A5)  ir  (P;  a)  - K [  3~  M  '±o((P  )l12)  (A5)  f(p;  a).  R |Ei  E  I7ij  ((-Pi  Pj) 
where  K is a fixed  factor  (not  modelled) which  ensures  a determinate  firm
size. Equation (A6) states  that  when  export volumes  in  the  restricted
market are  below  their  free trade  values,  the  price  PA at  which  uncon-
strained  suppliers  would  have  voluntarily  applied  the  restricted  quantity
XA is less  than  the  premium-ridden  price  at  which  sales  are  actually  made,38
i.e. PA  >  P  >  P;A  w;ere  PA  is  the  free trade price  in the  restricted
market.
Industry  profits,  i, is  the  difference  between  sales  revenues  and
costs,  both  evaluated  at the  VER-ridden  prices,  whereas  *virtual,  profits
given  by (A6)  are  evaluated  at  virtual  prices  P.  The  welfare  measure  is:
(A7)  AVW  =  W-W*- (Ar  +  AP  L) I  P*Z
where  L is  a scalar  indicating  the  size ot the  industry  in  the  market  for
Z.
The  elasticities  in  tables 2  and  3  are  used  to  calibrate  the
parameters  7ij  appearing  in  the  factor  demand  equations  (A3). Calibration
is  completed  by treating  parametrically  initial  price  and  quantity  data  and
by choosing  an initial  parametric  value  for  Z so that  profits  are  initially
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